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I. INTRODUCTION 
Nowhere in the justice system is a witness granted such responsibility 
and respect as the expert1—the only witness not limited to first-hand 
knowledge, but allowed to proffer opinions about why and how an event 
occurred.2  In response to the growing importance of experts, a great deal of 
jurisprudence developed over the past century regarding the admission of 
expert testimony, though initially it developed slowly.3  The debate around 
the admissibility of expert testimony truly picked up steam when 
scientifically complex civil litigation started to boom.4  This led to a 
nationwide sea change concerning the admission of expert testimony—
eventually referred to as the Daubert5 revolution.6 
Although civil litigation underwent a tectonic shift following the 
adoption of Daubert,7 the roles and responsibilities of the forensic expert did 
not change.8  In criminal cases, forensic experts offer jurors a wealth of 
information for understanding the crime, often serving as the lynchpin of a 
criminal case, relaying to jurors the importance of specific characteristics 
that link evidence to a particular person or object.9  This includes examining 
patterns (e.g., fingerprint, toolmark, or bloodstain patterns), analyzing 
certain substances (e.g., DNA, chemicals—especially drugs, or body fluids), 
or interpreting digital evidence.10  No matter the forensic discipline, 
 
 1  See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Importance of Daubert in Frye Jurisdictions, 42 
CRIM. L. BULL. 215 (2006) (“[T]he primary rationale for the Frye test is the policy concern 
that lay jurors will ascribe inflated importance to expert testimony.”).  
 2  See Dave G. Owen, A Decade of Daubert, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 345, 346 (2002) (“[T]he 
law of evidence gives experts especially wide latitude to offer opinions not available to 
ordinary witnesses.”); see also FED. R. EVID.  701, 702, 703, 705 and similar state evidentiary 
rules.  
 3  See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 88–92 (2009), http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12589.html 
(outlining the historical development of law concerning the admission of expert testimony). 
 4  See Arvin Maskin & Isabella C. Lacayo, Expert Evidence In The Federal Courts: A 
Historical Perspective, 20 WESTLAW J. CLASS ACTION 18, 1 (2013) (“modern admissibility 
rules were largely shaped in the context of mass-tort case”). 
 5  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).   
 6  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 88–90 (detailing the deficiencies of 
the standard outlined under Frye v. United States, the case history of Daubert, and the policy 
justifications for replacing Frye with Daubert and Federal Rule of Evidence 702). 
 7  See ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 236–37 (2005) (calling the 
replacement of Frye by Daubert a “profound improvement” in “civil, as opposed to criminal” 
litigation).  
 8  See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 4 (expanding on the continuity in 
forensic science over the decades).   
 9  See Jessica G. Cino, An Uncivil Action: Criminalizing Daubert in Procedure and 
Practice to Avoid Wrongful Convictions, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 651, 654 (2016) (finding 
“uniqueness” to be the key notion upon which forensic science is grounded).  
 10  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 25. 
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however, the forensic expert has two essential duties: (1) providing a 
scientific basis for identifying persons who commit crime; and (2) 
“protecting innocent persons from being convicted of crimes that they did 
not commit.”11  In fulfilling these critical duties, the word of the expert is 
often determinative.12  Forensic experts provide invaluable testimony both 
for the prosecution of the guilty and for the exoneration of the innocent.13  
Too often, however, the admission of forensic evidence is a system of high 
stakes and tragic shortcomings.14  Very infrequently, the system fails 
completely as a result of outright fraud.15  More often, when it falls short, it 
does so due to a reliance on flawed,16 unverified,17 erroneous,18 or 
subsequently discredited evidence.19  In these circumstances, the cost of 
failure may be the accused’s liberty.  Quis custodiet ipsos custodies?  
Translated: Who, then, watches the experts? 
In both theory and practice, the answer should be the court.  As stated, 
however, in the landmark 2009 report by the National Research Council 
(NRC), “[i]n a number of forensic science disciplines, forensic science 
professionals have yet to establish either the validity of their approach or the 
accuracy of their conclusions, and the courts have been utterly ineffective in 
addressing this problem.”20  That gulf, between evidence and empirical 
validity—a gap which is shrinking, but remains too large nonetheless—has 
 
 11  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 96.   
 12  See Imwinkelried, supra note 1 (finding the primary rationale for the Frye test to be 
the policy rationale that jurors will “ascribe inflated importance to expert testimony”); see 
also Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for 
Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715, 789 (1994) (“[M]ost commentators believe 
ostensibly scientific testimony may sway a jury even when as science it is palpably wrong. 
Science can be greatly distorted by the pressures of litigation, but once admitted into evidence, 
it has an imprimatur of legitimacy and validity, and cross-examination often will not expose 
its flaws.”).  
 13  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 4 (“For decades, the forensic science 
disciplines have produced valuable evidence that has contributed to the successful prosecution 
and conviction of criminals as well as to the exoneration of innocent people.”).   
 14  See id. at 44–46 (summarizing errors and their consequences).   
 15  See id. at 44 (describing the infamous fraud perpetrated by West Virginia State Police 
laboratory employee Fred Zain, in which more than 100 convictions were called into question 
because of Zain’s repeated falsification of lab results).   
 16  See id. at 178 (“Scientific studies support some aspects of bloodstain pattern 
analysis. . . . but some experts extrapolate far beyond what can be supported.”).   
 17  See id. at 173 (“Despite the paucity of research, some arson investigators continue to 
make determinations about whether or not a particular fire was set.”).   
 18  See id. at 176 (“. . . research is warranted in order to identify the circumstances within 
which the methods of forensic odontology can provide probative value.”).   
 19  See Ege v. Yukins, 485 F.3d 364, 377376 (6th Cir. 2007) (granting the appellant’s 
habeas corpus petition in part because the bite mark expert’s testimony was “significantly, if 
not completely, discredited”).  
 20  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 53.   
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led all fifty states to offer some form of post-conviction DNA testing for 
exonerating the wrongfully convicted.21  This reflects a clear consensus that 
extending procedural relief to those whose convictions were the result of 
flawed science is important.  Yet, in order to honor the spirit of this 
consensus and hew more closely to the underlying goals of forensic science, 
namely identifying the guilty and exonerating the innocent,22  courts must 
take a more proactive approach to preventing the admission of flawed 
science. 
Frye23 created the first common standard for screening scientific 
testimony.24  Centered around “general acceptance,” the Frye standard made 
the scientific community the barrier between expert testimony and the ears 
of the jurors.25  To be admissible, novel scientific techniques needed first to 
gain acceptance among members of the relevant scientific community.26  
Daubert, building on Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 702, shifted this 
gatekeeping role from the scientific community to the bench.27  The Daubert 
standard, centered around relevance and grounded in the notion that the 
adversarial system would protect jurors from flawed science,28 made the 
judge an arbiter of a five-part test designed, inter alia, to allow greater 
flexibility.29 
Although Daubert represented a watershed,30 the Frye test remains a 
critical consideration in evaluating expert testimony for a host of reasons.31  
First, Daubert’s profound influence has been largely limited to civil cases.32  
 
 21  DONALD E. WILKES, JR., STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF HANDBOOK § 
1:8, at 18 (2015–16 ed.).  
 22  See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 96.   
 23  Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  
 24  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 88 (calling Frye the “first notable 
development” in the development of tests governing the admissibility of scientific evidence).   
 25  See Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (requiring that “the thing from which the deduction is made” 
to have sufficient acceptance in order to be admitted as expert testimony).  
 26  Id.  
 27  See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596–97 (1993) (detailing both 
the supremacy of Rule 702 and recognizing “a gatekeeping role for the judge”).  
 28  See id. at 596 (anticipating “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary 
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof” as the means by which to mitigate 
the impact of scientifically unsound evidence).  
 29  See id. at 591 (requiring: (1) reliable methods and principles; (2) reliable application 
of a technique to a particular case; (3) that the expert testimony fit the facts of the case; (4) 
that the expert be qualified; and (5) general acceptance); see also id. at 594 (“The inquiry 
envisioned by Rule 702, we emphasize, is a flexible one.”).  
 30  STEIN, supra note 7, at 237.  
 31  Adina Schwartz, A “Dogma of Empiricism” Revisited: Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and the Need to Resurrect the Philosophical Insight of Frye v. United 
States, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 149, 193 n.157 (1997) (citing Frye’s deference to scientists as 
a “fundamental philosophical insight”).  
 32  STEIN, supra note 7, at 237 (“[T]he replacement of Frye by the Daubert Trilogy 
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On both the trial33 and appellate levels34 of the criminal justice system, 
Daubert challenges to prosecutorial evidence often go unheeded.  Secondly, 
because states bring more than 200 times the number of criminal 
prosecutions as the federal government,35 and the largest and most litigious 
jurisdictions retain a version of Frye in criminal prosecutions,36 the impact 
of Frye remains significant. 
More than forty percent of the U.S. population lives in a Frye 
jurisdiction.37  As such, Frye warrants continued attention. A quarter century 
after Daubert sought to shift the “gatekeeper” role from the scientific 
community to the bench and restructure admission around relevance, the 
changes have not produced the intended improvement of verifiable scientific 
accuracy during criminal trials.38  Instead, that hoped-for shift may have in 
fact ossified existing bad habits.39  Although existent Frye tests could be 
improved by modification,40 its underlying standard—general acceptance—
helps to minimize the introduction of flawed scientific evidence by filtering 
evidentiary decisions through the scientific community, and consequently, 
through Frye’s inherently more “austere” legal standard.41 
 
introduced a profound improvement into the civil, as opposed to criminal justice systems 
across the United States.”).  
 33  See Peter J. Neufeld, The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal Justice and Some 
Suggestions for Reform, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S107, S109 (“[D]espite the frequency with 
which scientific and expert testimony is proffered in criminal cases, there is a dearth of 
Daubert challenges and hearings.”).  
 34  DAVID L FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF 
EXPERT TESTIMONY § 1.35, 105 (stating that studies suggest the courts “employ Daubert more 
lackadaisically in criminal trials—especially in regard to prosecution evidence—than in civil 
cases—especially in regard to plaintiff evidence”).  
 35  Neufeld, supra note 33.  
 36  Edward J. Imwinkelried & William A. Tobin, Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis 
(CBLA) Evidence: Valid Inference or Ipse Dixit?, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 43, 55 (2003) 
[hereinafter Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis].  
 37  United States Census 2010, CENSUS, https://www.census.gov/2010census/ (combining 
population totals for California, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, 
Pennsylvania, Washington, and Washington D.C.).  
 38  STEIN, supra note 7, at 237.  
 39  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 110. “The judicial system is 
encumbered by, among other things, judges and lawyers who generally lack the scientific 
expertise necessary to comprehend and evaluate forensic evidence in an informed manner, 
trial judges (sitting alone) who must decide evidentiary issues without the benefit of judicial 
colleagues and often with little time for extensive research and reflection, and the highly 
deferential nature of the appellate review afforded trial courts’ Daubert rulings.”  NATIONAL 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 110. 
 40  Schwartz, supra note 31, 198–99 (advocating for a return to Frye, but stating that the 
case law surrounding general acceptance “requires modification”).  
 41  See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. 509 U.S. 579, 587–89 (describing the 
standard of relevance under Rule 702 as “liberal,” whereas the Frye general acceptance test 
is termed “austere”).  
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In five parts, this paper will argue for broader application of the Frye 
standard during criminal trials.  Part II will provide a general overview of 
forensic science.  Part III will outline the history of expert evidence, from 
early developments, to the general acceptance of Frye, and finally, to the 
incomplete revolution of Daubert.  Part IV will summarize current Frye 
standards in use.  Part V will make a case for the relative merits of Frye in 
the criminal context, and propose a common Frye standard designed to limit 
the admission of unverified expert testimony.  Part VI will apply that 
standard to the five stages of expert testimony outlined in Professor 
Imwinkelried’s paper.42 
In cases that rest on subsequently invalidated expert testimony, it is 
imperative to offer post-conviction relief in a manner that balances finality 
and accuracy—interests which, all too often, come into conflict.43  The 
ultimate goal for all participants in the criminal justice system, however, 
should be to create a world in which as few people as possible need to seek 
post-trial right relief—a world in which expert evidence is rigorously and 
effectively tested ex ante by trial courts.  Post-conviction avenues for 
exonerations are necessary, but they are only curative on a case-by-case 
basis; reforming the admission of expert evidence at trial represents a 
universal solution.  Both are necessary. 
II. CURRENT ISSUES SURROUNDING THE ADMISSION OF FORENSIC 
EVIDENCE 
Nearly ten years ago, the NRC laid bare the structural weaknesses of 
forensic science, ranging from non-standardized training regimens, to a 
dearth of resources, to wholly unsubstantiated practice areas.44  These 
revelations were not intended to disparage a deeply necessary intersection of 
science and the law.  Rather, keeping in mind Brandeis’ maxim that sunshine 
is the best disinfectant,45 these findings were released to spur further 
improvements to assist law enforcement in identifying the perpetrators of 
crime and to reduce the frequency of wrongful convictions.46  The fact 
 
 42  Edward J. Imwinkelried, Debunked, Discredited, but Still Defended Revising State 
Post-Conviction Relief Statutes to Cover Convictions Resting on Subsequently Invalidated 
Expert Testimony, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1095 (2018). 
 43  See Vincent P. Iannece, Breaking Bad Science: Due Process as a Vehicle for 
Postconviction Relief When Convictions Are Based on Unreliable Scientific Evidence, 89 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 195, 227 (2015) (contrasting the institutional need for finality with the broader 
societal goal of fairness and accuracy).  
 44  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 96; see also Cino, supra note 9, at 652 
(“[A] lack of research led to testimony—and closing arguments—that exceed[] the boundaries 
of science.”).  
 45  LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914) 
(“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”).  
 46  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 4–5. The NRC also included 
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remains, however, that nine years ago, a non-partisan, congressionally 
appointed committee found the state of forensic science to be lacking.47 
Forensic science is grounded in the notion that a piece of evidence has 
unique characteristics that can relate it back to another object or a specific 
user.48 In some forms of pattern identification, however, techniques have 
been found to lack scientific backing.49  Arson evidence and forensic 
odontology are examples of disciplines whose credibility in the courtroom is 
thought to rest largely on faith.50 
Although a scientific foundation exists to support the analysis of 
explosions (i.e., reconstructing the materials from which a bomb was built), 
the variability of burn patterns has not been studied to a degree that would 
allow forensic scientists to reliably determine whether a particular fire was 
the work of nature or arson.51  In spite of a “paucity of research,” evidentiary 
techniques amounting to little more than “rules of thumb” have been 
permitted in front of jurors.52  Such evidence was critical in securing a guilty 
verdict for Han Tak Lee.53  Mr. Lee was ultimately exonerated after serving 
twenty-four years in prison, partially because his conviction rested on a 
faulty scientific inference from testimony regarding “charring patterns and 
glass fracturing indicat[ing] a deliberately set fire.”54  Similarly, many of the 
commonplace forensic techniques used to indicate the presence of an 
accelerant have not held up under scientific scrutiny.55 
Forensic odontology, the application of dentistry to criminal 
investigations, may be the most controversial area of forensic science.56  Bite 
marks are often created during the course of particularly violent crimes, 
 
homeland security as one of the key policy imperatives underpinning a needed improvement 
in forensic science.  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 4–5. 
 47  See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 5 (“[M]ajor challenges still face 
the forensic science community.”).   
 48  Cino, supra note 9, at 654 (finding “uniqueness” to be the key notion upon which 
forensic science is grounded).  
 49  Id.  
 50  See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 170–76 (highlighting the 
weaknesses of the aforementioned disciplines).   
 51  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 172–73.   
 52  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 173.   
 53  Kirk Semple, Locked Away for 24 Years, an Exonerated Man Still Feels Imprisoned, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/11/nyregion/locked-away-
for-24-years-han-tak-lee-still-feels-imprisoned.html.  
 54  Id.  
 55  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 173 (“[M]any of the rules of thumb 
that are typically assumed to indicate that an accelerant was used (e.g., ‘allegatoring’ of wood, 
specific char patterns) have been shown not to be true.”).   
 56  See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 173 (calling bite mark comparison 
the most controversial of the areas surveyed by the NRC).   
EPPSTODOROW (DO NOT DELETE) 8/8/2018  2:03 PM 
1168 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1161 
including homicides, sexual assaults, and cases of child abuse.57  These 
marks can reliably be used to exclude suspects.58  Forensic odontology, 
however, cannot positively identify a suspect in an accurate manner, because 
“[u]nfortunately, bite marks on the skin will change over time and can be 
distorted by the elasticity of the skin, the unevenness of the surface bite, and 
swelling and healing.”59 
The gap between science and legal substantiation does not exist in a 
vacuum; it exists in the courtroom.  Unfortunately, once an expert is able to 
present scientifically unsound evidence to the jury, it is often too late for the 
defendant to recover, even if that evidence is “palpably wrong.”60  As a 
discipline, forensic science took the 2009 NRC Report incredibly seriously, 
and has responded earnestly.61  Legislatures, too, are beginning to respond 
in kind.62  The courts, however, have lagged behind.63 
Part of the problem is that, broadly speaking, “judges and lawyers [] 
lack the scientific expertise necessary to comprehend and evaluate forensic 
evidence in an informed manner.”64  Moreover, beyond the lack of 
specialized scientific knowledge in the legal community, it is the intellectual 
gap that exists between how jurists and scientists pursue the truth that often 
leads to incongruous results.65  Whereas the law embraces the adversarial 
system to pursue a final and just resolution of disputes66—a particularly 
fraught process for criminal defendants attempting to introduce expert 
testimony67—science is allowed the time to determine the truth 
 
 57  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 173. 
 58  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 176.   
 59  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 174.   
 60  See United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“[S]cientific proof 
may in some instances assume a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of 
layman.”); see also Black et al., supra note 12, at 789 (“Though there is some disagreement, 
most commentators believe ostensibly scientific testimony may sway a jury even when as 
science it is palpably wrong.”).  
 61  See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 1–2 (detailing the 
recommendations derived from the National Commission on Forensic Science’s four-year 
congressional mandate, as well as recommendations for the future).   
 62  See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473.7 (West 2017); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 
11.073 (West 2015).  
 63  See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 110 (labeling the adversarial 
process as unsuited “to the task of finding ‘scientific truth’”).   
 64  Id. at 110.   
 65  Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1481, 1484 
(1995) (“[D]ifferences between law and science have engendered both systemic and 
pragmatic dilemmas for the law and the actors within it.”).  
 66  See id. (finding the purpose of the adversarial process, and its version of “truth,” to 
contrast with the goals of science).  
 67  Margaret A. Berger, Procedural Paradigms for Applying the Daubert Test, 78 MINN. 
L. REV. 1345, 1359 (1994) (“Studies show that courts have been quite reluctant to authorize 
funds for defense experts.”); see also Paul C. Giannelli, “Junk Science”: The Criminal Cases, 
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empirically.68 
According to the NRC report “[m]uch forensic evidence . . . is 
introduced in criminal trials without “meaningful scientific validation, 
determination of error rates, or reliability testing to explain the limits of the 
discipline,” forcing the system to instead rely upon the adversarial process 
(or lack thereof) to separate the wheat from the chaff.69  In an extreme 
example of this process falling short, ballistics evidence was admitted even 
when the testifying sergeant “conceded, over and over again, that he relied 
mainly on his subjective judgment.”70  Although the judge opined that the 
sergeant’s testimony “ought not be considered admissible under Daubert,”71 
she admitted the evidence under pressure from the decisions of her peers, as 
similar ballistics evidence had been admitted by “every single court post-
Daubert . . . .”72  Remarkably, using bitemark evidence for the purposes of 
positive identification remains good law, even in the wake of the 2009 NRC 
report.73 Given the reality of what criminal defendants face when confronted 
with the state’s forensic experts—namely, an unequal battle for the minds of 
jurors74—it is time to revisit the standards by which those experts are 
introduced, in order to improve the test necessary for delimiting science from 
pseudoscience.75 
 
84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 105, 124–25 (1993) [hereinafter Junk Science] (detailing cases 
in Oklahoma and Alabama where “the defense did not retain experts, because the presiding 
judge had refused to authorize funds”).  
 68  Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, supra note 65, at 1484.  
 69  See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 107–08 (finding fraught areas of 
forensic science—namely bite mark, firearm, and tool mark identification, to regularly be 
introduced without any meaningful examination of their scientific underpinnings).  
 70  United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 107 (D. Mass. 2005).  
 71  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 108.  
 72  Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 108 (italicized emphasis omitted). The judge continued by 
stating: “I reluctantly come to [this] conclusion because of my confidence that any other 
decision will be rejected by appellate courts, in light of precedents across the country, 
regardless of the findings I have made. While I recognize that the Daubert-Kumho standard 
does not require the illusory perfection of a television show . . . the standards should be higher 
than were met in this case, and than have been imposed across the country. The more courts 
admit this type of toolmark evidence without requiring documentation, proficiency testing, or 
evidence of reliability, the more sloppy practices will endure; we should require more.”  Id. 
at 109.  
 73  See Milone v. Camp, 22 F.3d 693, 702 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding the inclusion of forensic 
odontology in a murder trial insufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial); see also Burke 
v. Town of Walpole, 405 F.3d 66, 82–83 (1st Cir. 2005) (rejecting petitioners claim that being 
jailed for forty-one days on the basis of bite mark evidence, even in the presence of 
exculpatory DNA evidence, represented “reckless disregard for the truth”).  
 74  Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert and Criminal Prosecutions, 26 CRIM. JUST. 61, 62 (2011) 
[hereinafter Daubert and Criminal Prosecutions]; see also NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
supra note 3, at 98 (“[P]rosecutors usually have an advantage over most defendants in offering 
expert testimony in criminal cases.”).  
 75  See Berger, supra note 67, at 1359 (noting the difficulties defendants face in procuring 
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III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EXPERT EVIDENCE: EARLY COMMON LAW TO 
DAUBERT 
A. Early Developments 
Throughout the history of the Anglo-American justice system, experts 
have had a hand in settling disputes.76  Over time, common law courts 
employed two methods for drawing upon the knowledge of experts, one of 
which forms the basis for expert testimony as we know it today.77  The first 
method, in place for hundreds of years, employed expert jurors when issues 
extended outside the ken of the layman.78  Pulled from a pool of skilled 
tradesmen, a special jury would be tasked with a case that directly related to 
their craft.79  The second method, “call[ing] to the aid of the court skilled 
persons whose opinion it might adopt or not as it pleased,”80 was a far more 
permissive process than that seen in today’s courtrooms.81  If an individual 
was proffered as an expert in a given area, he would be admitted and allowed 
to testify.82  Although overbroad, this standard nonetheless represents the 
lineage from which today’s system of expert testimony derives; experts were 
qualified according to their area of specialization, they outlined a particular 
scientific method (the major premise), then applied that method to the 
particular fact pattern before them (the minor premise).83  The devil, 
however, is indeed in the details when it comes to the admission of expert 
testimony.  Laissez-faire was not to last.84 
 
expert testimony).  
 76  See Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert 
Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40 (1901) (describing developments in Anglo-American 
expert testimony, from 1345 until 1901).  
 77  See id. (stating that “there seem to have been two modes of using what expert 
knowledge there was”—namely, impaneling a special jury and offering expert testimony to 
lay jurors).  
 78  See id. at 41 (outlining the history and procedures involved in impaneling a special 
jury).  
 79  See id. (listing, for example, the leader of a guild as a potential expert juror).  
 80  Id. at 40.  
 81  Owen, supra note 2, at 354 (“The courts generally allowed . . . experts to provide 
relevant testimony about technical matters as a matter of course: once a person was qualified 
as an expert, the judge simply admitted into evidence his or her relevant opinion testimony.”).   
 82  See id. (“At early common law, the only real limit[] on expert testimony was that the 
person proffered as an expert be qualified as an expert in the field.”).  
 83  Hand, supra note 76, at 52. (“Having no experience . . . [the jury] should take those 
generalizations into the stock of the major premises which they apply to the facts, and using 
them, say whether A wrote the note or did not.”).  
 84  See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013–14 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (representing the 
first major test constricting the free flow of expert testimony in court).  
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B. The Formulation of Frye 
As the sciences began to exert greater and greater influence in the early 
twentieth century, the legal system struggled to create a coherent test to 
govern the admissibility of evidence outside the ken of the layman.85  Frye 
v. United States86 represented the first major development in reforming the 
admission of expert evidence.87  Although Frye was barely a two-page 
opinion with its jurisdictional influence limited to Washington D.C.,88 it 
grew to become the predominant test governing the admission of expert 
evidence in the United States.89  This unlikely landmark case, citing no 
authority, and offering no explanation, reshaped the landscape of admissible 
expert evidence around “general acceptance.”90  Frye’s underlying facts 
were simple.  The defendant appealed from a conviction of second degree 
murder, alleging a single assignment of error—the denial of a defense expert 
offered to testify to the result of a “deception test.”91  In essence, the test was 
an early version of a lie detector that relied on measuring systolic blood 
pressure in order to discern true answers from false ones.92 
On appeal, the court affirmed the exclusion of the expert’s testimony 
on the grounds that use of this proto-lie detector had not been accepted by 
physiological or psychological authorities.93  Laying the groundwork for 
decades of evidentiary decisions to come, Frye laid out an “evolutionary” 
process by which a technique was to be vetted by the relevant scientific 
community.94  The key language states: 
 
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line 
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to 
define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the 
 
 85  Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, supra note 65, at 1486.  
 86  293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  
 87  See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 88 (calling Frye the “first notable 
development” in the development of tests governing the admissibility of scientific evidence).   
 88  Frye, 293 F. at 1014.  
 89  See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United 
States, A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1205 (1980) [hereinafter Admissibility 
of Novel Scientific Evidence] (declaring that the Frye test “dominated the admissibility of 
scientific evidence for more than half a century”).  
 90  Frye, 293 F. at 1014.  
 91  Id. at 1014.  
 92  Id. at 1013 (“Scientific experiments, it is claimed, have demonstrated that fear, rage, 
and pain always produce a rise of systolic blood pressure, and that conscious deception or 
falsehood, concealment of facts, or guilt of crime, accompanied by fear of detection . . . raises 
the systolic blood pressure . . . .”).  
 93  Id. at 1014.  
 94  See Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence, supra note 89, at 1204 (stating that the 
evolutionary process by which expert evidence is vetted through the scientific community 
hinges on an “experimental” stage whereby it undergoes scrutiny).  
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principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way 
in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized 
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the 
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained 
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.95 
 
This passage ushered in a two-step analysis.96  First, a judge must decide 
under which scientific field a technique falls.97  Second, that judge must 
determine whether the members of that field have generally accepted that 
technique.98  For seventy years following its formulation, Frye’s “‘general 
acceptance’ test [was] the dominant standard for determining the admission 
of novel scientific evidence at trial.”99 
On its own, however, Frye did not delineate either the boundaries or 
the justifications for centering its test around the general acceptance of the 
scientific community.100  The test was promulgated ipse dixit; courts across 
the country, however, have provided post-hoc rationalizations, offering a 
pluralistic, regional approach to the idea of general acceptance.101  The 
common crystallization of the policy underpinning Frye could best be 
summarized as “a standard which in effect permits the experts who know 
most about a procedure to experiment and to study it,”102 thus assuring that 
“those persons most qualified to assess the validity of a scientific technique 
[] have the determinative voice.”103  In this way, the Frye test was viewed as 
an attempt to limit the risk of exposing jurors—broadly thought to be 
overawed in the presence of an expert—to flawed scientific testimony104 by 
first screening the testimony through a test of an “essentially conservative 
nature.”105 
 
 95  Frye, 293 F. at 1014.  
 96  See Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence, supra note 89, at 1208.  
 97  See Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence, supra note 89, at 1208. 
 98  See Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence, supra note 89, at 1208. 
 99  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585 (1993).  
 100  See Imwinkelried, supra note 1 (“In Frye itself the court did not articulate any policy 
justification for the general acceptance standard; the court merely mandated the standard as 
ipse dixit.”).  
 101  See id. (“Later courts developed the policy rationale that was conspicuously missing 
in the original Frye opinion.”).  
 102  People v. Barbara, 255 N.W.2d 171, 194 (Mich. 1977). The court would go on to 
ground the Frye test in the tradition of the expert jury described by Learned Hand, supra notes 
60–62, describing the general consensus test as, “[i]n effect, [] a kind of technical jury, which 
must first pass on the scientific status of a procedure before the lay jury utilizes it in making 
its findings of fact.”  Id.  
 103  People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 325 (Cal. 1994).  
 104  See Imwinkelried, supra note 1 (describing the historical fear held by the court that a 
risk will “overawe lay jurors”).  
 105  Leahy, 882 P.2d at 325.  
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Within these broad confines, there existed, and exists, a great deal of 
variation and consternation about how to quantify when a technique has 
achieved general acceptance, and who constitutes the relevant scientific 
community.106  There are, however, some common patterns that can be 
delineated.  First, the test is limited to novel scientific theories.107  This 
creates, in effect, an inevitable twilight period between the time when a 
scientific principle is discovered, and when that principle is sufficiently 
validated by peer review.108  Secondly, in many jurisdictions, the Frye test is 
not triggered by “soft” sciences such as psychiatry, psychology, or the social 
sciences.109  Across jurisdictions, however, the Frye test was understood to 
be a deliberate obstacle, interposed between uncertain scientific principles 
and the jury.110 
Although it would assume a position of massive import, Frye almost 
became an afterthought.111  After twenty-five years, the case had only been 
cited in two federal cases112 and nine state cases.113  By the time the Federal 
Rules of Evidence were adopted in 1975, fifty-two years later, general 
acceptance itself was broadly accepted across jurisdictions, though it was 
 
 106  See generally Cino, supra note 9, at 660 (calling Frye “one of the most vague and 
ambiguous decisions in American jurisprudence”); see also Comparative Bullet Lead 
Analysis, supra note 36, at 58 (“If the Frye standard is to have any teeth at all, the only sensible 
way to apply it is to expand the inquiry to canvass the sentiment in any group of experts whose 
education and training equip them to assess the validity of the theory”).  
 107  See Imwinkelried, supra note 1 (stating that the courts “have limited the reach of the 
test in three respects” including liming the test to novel theories, excluding soft sciences, and 
exempting non-scientific expertise); cf. Ramirez v. State, 810 So.2d 836, 848–50 (Fla. 2001) 
(modifying the novelty requirement starkly in the process of excluding an established forensic 
technique—knife mark analysis—from the jury).  Notably, the court finds the testimony of 
the state’s forensic experts as to the technique’s general acceptance to be facially insufficient 
on its own. Id.  
 108  See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. 1923).  
 109  See, e.g., People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1984), overruled by People v. 
Mendoza, 4 P.3d 265 (Cal. 2000) (rejecting the application of the California variant of Frye 
by distinguishing between expert testimony and scientific evidence).  
 110  See People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1245 (Cal. 1976) (“Frye was deliberately intended 
to interpose a substantial obstacle to the unrestrained admission of evidence based upon new 
scientific principles.”).  
 111  See Cino, supra note 9, at 660.  
 112  See Refoule v. Ellis, 74 F. Supp. 336 (N.D. Ga. 1947) (rejecting the use of a polygraph 
by citing its disapproval in Frye); Medley v. United States, 155 F.2d 857 (D.C. 1946) (finding 
that spectroscopy had sufficient acceptance within the scientific community).  
 113  State v. Bohner, 246 N.W. 314 (Wis. 1933); Beuschel v. Manowitz, 271 N.Y.S. 277 
(Sup. Ct. 1934); People v. Kenny, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Co. Ct. 1938); People v. Forte, 4 N.Y.S.2d 
913 (Co. Ct. 1938); Bednarik v. Bednarik, 16 A.2d 80 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1940); State 
v. Cole, 188 S.W.2d 43 (Mo. 1945); State v. Lowry, 185 P.2d 147 (Kan. 1947); Boeche v. 
State, 37 N.W.2d 593 (Neb. 1949); People v. Morse, 38 N.W.2d 322 (Mich. 1949).  In seven 
out of the nine cases, the holding of Frye was interpreted extremely narrowly, and only 
applied to either similar versions of the systolic blood pressure device, or subsequent lie 
detectors.  Id. 
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infrequently litigated.114  Yet, although Frye was widely accepted in the 
criminal world,115 it was not cited federally in a civil case until 1984.116  
Ultimately, following years of mounting frustration with the general 
acceptance standard in both arenas, it was ultimately a civil case that wrote 
Frye out of the law books in a majority of jurisdictions.117 
C. An Incomplete Revolution 
Daubert was a revolution a long time in the making.118  Based in part 
on the vagueness of the Frye test, courts found it difficult to determine the 
appropriate body to evaluate whether an idea was generally accepted, and to 
determine the degree to which a scientific technique needed to be accepted 
in order to constitute general acceptance.119  Beyond the difficulties 
associated with the ambiguities of Frye, there was concern that the test was 
“unduly conservative,” serving to obscure the “principles of relevance and 
probity.”120  There was also a push by scholars for a test which served the 
goal of Frye, filtering out unsound science without serving as an obstacle to 
cutting-edge techniques.121 
The adoption of FRE 702 in 1975 was intended to respond to these 
concerns, and to guide the introduction of expert evidence for federal courts 
in both civil and criminal litigation.122  Despite its admirable goal, however, 
Rule 702 only served to further divide jurisdictions.123  On its face, the 
 
 114  See Cino, supra note 9, at 660 (showing that, though Frye had been accepted by almost 
every U.S. jurisdiction by the time the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted, it was 
infrequently litigated).  
 115  Thomas Lyons, Frye, Daubert and Where Do We Go From Here?, R.I. B.J., Jan. 1997, 
at 5 (“Virtually every federal and state court addressing the general acceptance standard 
adopted it.”).   
 116  Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 739 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(representing the first federal civil opinion to invoke Frye).  
 117  See Cino, supra note 9, at 661 (listing Frye’s shortcomings as a series of unanswered 
questions, including “[w]ho determines the relevant scientific community,” “[h]ow does the 
court define the relevant scientific community,” and “[h]ow mainstream should a theory or 
technique be before it becomes relevant”).  
 118  See Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence, supra note 89, at 1207–08 (writing 
fourteen years before the passage of Daubert that “the problems Frye has engendered—the 
difficulties in applying the test and the anomalous results it creates—so far outweigh these 
advantages that the argument for adopting a different test has become overwhelming”).  
 119  Cino, supra note 9, at 661.  
 120  Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, supra note 65, at 1486.  
 121  See Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence, supra note 89, at 1224; see also Cino, 
supra note 9, at 661 (“The argument against using the Frye rule is that it may frustrate or 
foreclose the use of innovative techniques.”).  
 122  See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 586–87 (1993) (casting the 
merits of Frye in a dubious light and asserting that the Frye test “was superseded by the 
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence”).  
 123  See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 89 (showing how Rule 702’s 
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original version of Rule 702 stood in opposition to the conservative Frye test, 
mandating that specialized knowledge be heard by the trier of fact, so long 
as: (1) the expert was qualified; and (2) that the evidence served to help the 
fact finder understand a relevant issue in the case.124  Assistance to the jury 
was thus substituted for acceptance by the scientific community.125  In the 
wake of the adoption of Rule 702, there was much consternation over 
whether Frye had been subsumed by the Federal Rules.126  And although 
Frye had largely been confined to criminal trials, by the last quarter of the 
twentieth century it was complaints of “junk science” in tort claims that 
ignited the most visible debates.127  From this point on, criminal trials were 
to take a backseat to tort claims in the debate over expert evidence.128 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a civil case, finally 
resolved the question of Rule 702’s supremacy.129  Merrell Dow, the makers 
of Bendectin, had moved for summary judgment, supported by an affidavit 
from a qualified expert who stated that there had been no study 
demonstrating a link between Bendectin and deformations in embryonic 
development.130  The plaintiffs attempted to counter with experts of their 
own.131  The district court, however, excluded the plaintiffs’ experts on the 
grounds that their testimony relied on animal studies, unsubstantiated 
pharmacological studies, and re-analyses of previously unpublished 
epidemiological data—,information that the district court found to have 
insufficient acceptance among the relevant scientific community.132  The 
appellate court, citing Frye, affirmed.133 
The U.S. Supreme Court not only found that Frye had been superseded 
by the Federal Rules of Evidence, but also that a “rigid standard” was “at 
odds with [the] Rules’ liberal thrust, and their general approach of relaxing 
the traditional barriers to ‘opinion’ testimony.”134  The Daubert Court found 
that Rule 702’s gatekeeping function was more properly the responsibility 
 
apparent substitution of the requirement of general acceptance with “mere ‘assistance’ to the 
trier of fact” caused a great deal of controversy among the courts).  
 124  FED. R. EVID.  702.  
 125  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 89.  
 126  Id.  
 127  Id.  
 128  See Junk Science, supra note 67, at 110–11 (contrasting the vigor with which “civil 
litigation with high financial stakes” is litigated, with the relative absence of attention received 
in criminal cases by stating “[t]he neglect of the problems of expert testimony in criminal 
prosecutions is deplorable, if not inexplicable”).  
 129  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).  
 130  Id.  
 131  Id.  
 132  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm,, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 575 (S.D. Cal. 1989).  
 133  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1129–30 (9th Cir. 1991).  
 134  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.  
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of the judge, who would then be tasked with assessing the “scientific validity 
of a particular technique or methodology on which an opinion is 
premised.”135  Drawing from Rule 702’s language concerning scientific 
knowledge, the Court formed a five part test for assessing the validity of a 
theory or technique, consisting of asking: (1) whether a theory has been 
tested; (2) whether that theory has been subjected to peer review; (3) whether 
a known rate of error has been demonstrated; (4) whether there were 
standards governing the technique; and lastly, (5) whether the theory met the 
traditional Frye general acceptance standard.136  Thus, the Daubert Court 
subsumed the scientific community’s consensus within a broader, jurist-
centered approach to expert evidence, open to the admission of cutting-edge 
techniques.137  The Court emphasized that the standard was a flexible one, 
focusing on principles and methodology, not conclusions.138  To combat the 
introduction of faulty evidence, the Court leaned on the advantages of the 
adversarial system’s “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary 
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof [as] the traditional 
and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”139 
Daubert’s impact was dramatic, spurring an additional amendment of 
the Federal Rules,140 and two subsequent cases that came to be seen as 
comprising the Daubert trilogy.141  As the evolving standard has established 
itself, it is evident that questions concerning the admissibility of expert 
evidence are generally raised pretrial142 and are largely immunized against 
reversal.143  Moreover, “whether Daubert’s specific factors are, or are not, 
reasonable measures of reliability in a particular case[, it] is a matter with 
which the law grants the trial judge broad latitude to determine.”144 
 
 135  Id. at 594.  
 136  Id. at 592–94. 
 137  See id. at 594–95 (stating that the “overarching subject is the scientific validity and 
thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability—of the principles that underlie a proposed 
submission”).  
 138  Id.  
 139  Id. at 596.  
 140  FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment.  
 141  See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) (holding that the “abuse of 
discretion” standard applies to the trial court’s decision to exclude evidence); Kumho Tire 
Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (finding that Daubert’s gatekeeping role applies to 
all expert testimony, not just scientific testimony).  
 142  See Alfred v. Caterpillar, Inc., 262 F.3d 1083, 1087 (10th Cir. 2001) (“district courts 
[can] reject as untimely Daubert motions raised late in the trial process”).  
 143  See Gen. Elec. Co., 522 U.S. at 142–43 (quoting Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U.S. 645, 
658 (1879) (“Cases arise where it is very much a matter of discretion with the court whether 
to receive or exclude the evidence; but the appellate court will not reverse in such a case, 
unless the ruling is manifestly erroneous.”).  
 144  Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S at 138.  
EPPSTODOROW (DO NOT DELETE) 8/8/2018  2:03 PM 
2018] REFRYED FORENSICS 1177 
D. Daubert and the Admission of Faulty Forensic Science 
Just as the goals of science and law are different, the aims and means 
of civil and criminal law are different, precluding the use of a uniform 
solution for expert testimony.  Replacing Frye with Daubert produced “a 
profound improvement” in the civil justice system,145 resulting in rising 
standards of dependability, and an environment open to cutting-edge 
science.146  These benefits, however, have not been similarly reflected in the 
criminal system.147  In the seven years following Daubert, there were sixty-
seven federal appellate cases involving challenges to the government’s 
evidence in criminal cases.148  Of those sixty-seven cases, sixty-one were 
won by the prosecution.149  Of those six won by the defense, just one resulted 
in the reversal of a conviction.150  This indicates a low likelihood of 
overturning evidentiary rulings in criminal cases on Daubert grounds.151 
The question, then, is why the difference in results between civil and 
criminal cases?  The answers are largely straightforward.  The first reason is 
money.  In civil cases, which frequently involve experts when litigating toxic 
tort suits, the contingency fee structure means that even a financially-limited 
party can still afford to hire an expert.152  Criminal defendants, on the other 
hand, often cannot afford experts.  And the criminal justice system generally 
does not afford them the means to procure experts.153  This frequently puts 
 
 145  STEIN, supra note 7, at 237.  
 146  See D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of 
Certainty Being left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 149 (2000) (crediting the Daubert 
trilogy with the heightening of standards in civil cases).  
 147  See STEIN, supra note 7, at 237 (“[T]he replacement of Frye by the Daubert Trilogy 
introduced a profound improvement into the civil, as opposed to the criminal justice systems 
across the United States.”); see also Daubert and Criminal Prosecutions, supra note 74 
(“There is little question that Daubert has had a substantial impact on civil litigation”).  
 148  Risinger, supra note 146, at 104.  
 149  Risinger, supra note 146, at 104. 
 150  Risinger, supra note 146, at 104. 
 151  Risinger, supra note 146, at 104. 
 152  See Neufeld, supra note 33, at S109–10.  “The reality is that if a corporation is sued 
for millions of dollars in a toxic tort case, plaintiffs’ attorneys hire scientific experts because 
they stand to share in any settlements or award.  The substantial legal fees paid by the 
corporation enable civil defendants to secure the services of equally well-regarded experts. 
Judges consider the science with far greater scrutiny and caution.”  Neufeld, supra note 33, at 
S109–10.   
 153  See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 11 (highlighting, among the 
differences between criminal and civil cases, the fact that civil defendants have equal access 
to experts as plaintiffs, whereas “prosecutors usually have an advantage over most defendants 
in offering expert testimony in criminal cases”).  This is not to say that indigent defendants 
require further public funds for procuring experts to vindicate their rights. Frye is markedly 
less reliant on the adversarial process, as the decision-making body—the scientific 
community—is not party to litigation.  See, e.g., People v. Barbara, 255 N.W.2d 171, 194 
(Mich. 1977) (describing the general consensus test as, “[i]n effect, [] a kind of technical jury, 
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criminal defendants on an unequal playing field in offering expert 
testimony.154  The second reason is incentive.  In a civil case, either party has 
the right and incentive to appeal a non-frivolous loss, whereas criminal cases 
offer more restricted appellate access and a lower chance of success.155  The 
third reason is experiential.  A criminal defendant’s challenge will often fail 
because courts “routinely affirm admissibility citing earlier decisions rather 
than facts established at a hearing.”156  In addition, defense lawyers 
frequently lack the scientific background or funds to proceed with a Daubert 
challenge to forensic science.157  It appears that appellate courts are more 
willing “to second-guess trial court judgments on the admissibility of 
purported scientific evidence in civil cases than in criminal cases.”158  A 
broad survey of cases found the thoroughness with which criminal cases 
were evaluated to be sorely lacking.159 
Has, then, Daubert’s liberal criteria for admitting expert testimony 
proven incompatible with the realities of the criminal justice system?  The 
legacy of Daubert would suggest it either opened the door too wide, or relied 
on “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and 
careful instruction,” which are factors better suited to civil trials.160  Moving 
the gatekeeping role from the laboratory to the courtroom may have proven 
too great a burden for the criminal justice system.161  In their concurrence to 
the Daubert opinion, Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens, as odd a pair of 
bedfellows as there ever was, cautioned against issues related to relocating 
the gatekeeper function.162  While FRE 402 provides guidance governing the 
 
which must first pass on the scientific status of a procedure before the lay jury utilizes it in 
making its finding of fact”).  
 154  Daubert and Criminal Prosecutions, supra note 74, at 62; see also NATIONAL 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 98 (“Prosecutors usually have an advantage over most 
defendants in offering expert testimony in criminal cases.”).  
 155  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 98.   
 156  Neufeld, supra note 33, at S109–10.  
 157  Neufeld, supra note 33, at S109–10. 
 158  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 11.   
 159  Risinger, supra note 146, at 100.  “The system shipwreck I fear is that . . . we will find 
that civil cases are subject to strict standards of expertise quality control, while criminal cases 
are not.  The result would be that the pocketbooks of civil defendants would be protected from 
plaintiffs’ claims by exclusion of undependable expert testimony, but that criminal defendants 
would not be protected from conviction based on similarly undependable expert testimony.  
Such a result would seem particularly unacceptable given the law’s claim that inaccurate 
criminal convictions are substantially worse than inaccurate civil judgments, reflected in the 
different applicable standards of proof.”  Risinger, supra note 146, at 100. 
 160  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993).  
 161  See Neufeld, supra note 33, at S109–10 (“If no one challenges the speculative science 
or scientists, there is nothing for a gatekeeper to tend to.”).  
 162  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596–97 (Rehnquist, C.J., & Stevens, J., concurring) (agreeing 
with the majority that the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded Frye, but presciently 
expressing a belief in the court system’s capacity to handle matters of statute and case law, as 
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relevance of admissible evidence, there is no such guidance for jurists to 
assess scientific “reliability.”163  Of this added responsibility, Justice 
Rehnquist stated that he did “not doubt that Rule 702 confides to the judge 
some gatekeeping responsibility . . . but I do not think it imposes on them 
either the obligation or authority to become amateur scientists in order to 
perform that role.164 
IV. CURRENT FRYE STANDARDS 
As it exists in criminal cases, Daubert represents a two-part problem.  
First, the standard is too permissive.165  Second, there are structural issues 
inherent in the criminal system, not present in the civil system, which 
dampen the effectiveness of Daubert’s intended safeguards against unsound 
science.166  Therefore, it is worthwhile to re-examine the standard the 
Daubert court deemed too austere.167 
The Frye test offers a chance to obviate the two key issues posed by 
Daubert as a result of its inherently conservative nature, potentially offering 
criminal defendants a better chance of having scientifically unsound 
evidence excluded before trial.168  It is appropriate, therefore, to review the 
state of Frye as currently implemented in state courts, with an eye toward 
assessing the factors critical to aiding the twin goals of forensic science 
specifically, and justice generally; namely, the goals of convicting the guilty 
and exonerating the innocent.  To do so, this paper reviews the existing Frye 
jurisdictions’ definition of “general acceptance,” the sources the courts look 
to for validation, and the criteria under which the courts assess “general 
acceptance,” as well as each jurisdiction’s policy justifications for doing so. 
A. California: People v. Leahy 
California, our nation’s most populous state, remains a Frye 
jurisdiction.169  People v. Leahy,170 a post-Daubert challenge, involved a 
criminal defendant who appealed the admission of a horizontal gaze 
 
opposed to defining “scientific knowledge”).  
 163  Id.  
 164  Id. at 600.  
 165  See infra Part II.D for a discussion of the issues surrounding the admission of expert 
evidence in criminal trials under Daubert.  
 166  Id.  
 167  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.  
 168  See STEIN, supra note 7, at 196–97 (expressing skepticism at the ability of Daubert to 
offer individualized testing to criminal defendants, and support for excluding evidence based 
on the Frye standard in the criminal setting).  
 169  People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321 (Cal. 1994) (confirming the vitality of Frye in 
California).  
 170  Id.  
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nystagmus (HGN) field sobriety test171 used as evidence against him in a 
DUI trial.172  The trial court found that Kelly173-Frye, the California variant 
of the Frye test, was inapplicable, on the basis that the HGN field sobriety 
test was not in fact a true test, but merely a description of symptoms.174  The 
California Supreme Court both overturned the trial court’s decision and 
required the application of Kelly-Frye, while also reasserting the validity of 
the Kelly-Frye analysis in the wake of Daubert.175 
As defined by the court, “general acceptance” does not require a 
unanimous opinion, or even majority support by the scientific community.176  
It is instead a decision of whether “the technique is deemed unreliable by 
‘scientists significant in number or expertise.’”177  Those tasked with making 
the determination as to the reliability of an evolving technique are the 
members of the scientific community developing a given method.178  Kelly-
Frye defines general acceptance along the lines of the traditional, Frye, two-
step process, requiring: (1) that reliability be established by expert testimony; 
and (2) that such testimony be given by a properly qualified expert.179  
California, however, added the requirement that “the proponent of the 
evidence must demonstrate that correct scientific procedures were used in 
the particular case.”180  Moreover, California affords limited de novo appeal 
rights to those challenging Kelly-Frye decisions.  Boundaries of review are 
generally limited to the evidence available on the record.  In special 
circumstances, exceptions allow the appellate court to view scientific 
evidence outside the record.181 
From a policy standpoint, the Leahy court’s justifications for 
maintaining the Frye standard were identified as: 
 
(1) assuring that those persons most qualified to assess the 
validity of a scientific technique would have the determinative 
voice, (2) providing a ‘minimal reserve of experts’ to critically 
examine each technique in a particular case, (3) promoting 
uniformity of decision based on finding a consensus in the 
 
 171  Id. at 323 (“Nystagmus is an involuntary rapid movement of the eyeball, which may 
be horizontal, vertical, or rotary. An inability of the eyes to maintain visual fixation as they 
are turned from side to side . . . is known as horizontal gaze nystagmus.”).  
 172  Id. at 323.  
 173  People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976).  
 174  Leahy, 882 P.2d at 324.  
 175  Id. at 325.  
 176  Id. at 329.  
 177  Id. at 336 (quoting People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354, 1377 (Cal. 1982)).  
 178  Id. at 325.  
 179  Id.  
 180  Leahy, 882 P.2d at 325. 
 181  Id. at 330 (citing People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 736 (Ct. App. 1992)).  
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scientific community, and (4) protecting the parties by its 
‘essentially conservative nature.’182 
 
These four points, in combination with the relative austerity of Kelly-Frye, 
are credited by the Leahy court as serving to prevent unreliable techniques 
from being used to determine the guilt or innocence of criminal defendants 
by precluding “the vagaries of pseudoscience.”183 
B. Washington, D.C.—Roberts v. United States 
Washington, D.C. remains a Frye jurisdiction, as confirmed in 2000.184  
In Roberts v. United States,185 a defendant challenged the trial court’s 
decision to admit DNA evidence on the grounds that the F.B.I.’s statistical 
formula failed to incorporate the rate of false positives.186  In evaluating that 
evidence, the D.C. Court of Appeals defined general acceptance along strict 
Frye lines.187  The Roberts court determined that it was permitted to consider 
“not only expert evidence of record, but also judicial opinions in other 
jurisdictions, as well as pertinent legal and scientific commentaries.”188  The 
court’s criteria for assessing general acceptance were quite simple, 
formulated as “consensus versus controversy . . . not its validity.”189  In D.C. 
courts, Frye decisions are reviewed de novo.190  Before Roberts, the court 
had outlined its justifications for maintaining Frye as a safeguard against 
exposing the jury to the particular weight exercised by expert testimony.191  
In the view of the Roberts court, in order to be admissible, “the totality of 
expert testimony must be sufficiently extensive and coherent so that one can 
reasonably say that an expert . . . testified that the elements at issue . . . have 
been established under sound scientific principles.”192  Ultimately, the 
 
 182  Id.  
 183  Id. at 331.  
 184  See Bahura v. S.E.W. Inv’rs, 754 A.2d 928, 943 n.15 (D.C. 2000) (“[A] division of 
this court lacks the authority to supplant Frye with Daubert and Kumho Tire Co.”); see also 
M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312–13 (D.C. 1971) (detailing how the District of Columbia 
Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970 stripped the United States Court of 
Appeals of the power to review judgments of the D.C. Court of Appeals).  
 185  916 A.2d 922 (D.C. 2007).  
 186  Id. at 929.  
 187  Id. (citing Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (1923)).  
 188  Id. (citing United States v. Porter, 618 A.2d 629, 635 (D.C. 1992)).  
 189  Id.  
 190  Id.  
 191  Bahura v. S.E.W. Inv’rs, 754 A.2d 928, 947 (D.C. 2000) (Stedman, J., concurring) 
(“While ordinarily it is within the province of a jury to pick and choose among the evidence 
that it hears on the basis of its common sense and experience, I think that given the nature of 
expert testimony, the same freedom cannot be uncritically admitted.”).  
 192  Id. at 948.  
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Roberts court rejected the defendant’s appeal, concluding that the Frye 
standards do not require testimony regarding laboratory error rates.193 
C. Florida—Ramierez v. State 
Although at one point the state legislature attempted to mandate use of 
the Daubert standard in both civil and criminal trials, the Florida Supreme 
Court overruled the legislature and reasserted the vitality of the Frye test.194  
Florida’s variant of the Frye test may serve as the best model for excluding 
forensic evidence that lacks scientific backing.195  Its version of the test offers 
a “reinvigorated Frye test” that incorporates elements of Daubert,196 creating 
a “Frye-plus-reliability” standard.197  Under this variant, the court uses a 
more malleable definition of the traditional novelty requirement,198 which 
makes a greater number of cases eligible for an evidentiary challenge, while 
also enveloping expert evidence within a reliability standard.199 
In this 2001 appeal, the defendant, Ramirez, challenged his murder 
conviction, which, in part, rested on the testimony of a Miami crime 
technician who concluded that the defendant’s knife “was the murder 
weapon to the exclusion of all others.”200  Although it took three appeals and 
the influence of Daubert,201 the Florida Supreme court ultimately excluded 
the State’s tool mark evidence on the grounds that it lacked an adequate 
scientific basis to be presented to the jury.202 
The Ramirez court defined general acceptance as requiring more than a 
mere “nose count” of experts in the field; rather it is the court’s role to accord 
weight to relevant sources, including “expert testimony, scientific and legal 
 
 193  Roberts v. United States, 916 A.2d 922, 931 (D.C. 2007).  
 194  In re Amendments to the Florida Evidence Code, 210 So.3d 1231, 1240 (Fla. 2017).  
 195  Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert Revisited, 41 CRIM. LAW. BULL. (2005) [hereinafter 
Daubert Revisited].  
 196  Id.  
 197  See Donaldson v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 767 N.E.2d 314, 326 (Ill. 2002) (naming 
the revised Frye test).  
 198  See Ramirez v. State, 810 So.2d 836, 852 (Fla. 2001) (particularizing Frye’s novelty 
requirement such that it applies to a specific forensic expert’s version of knife mark 
identification procedure).  Toolmark identification generally, and knife-mark identification 
particularly, were well-established branches of forensic science in 2001, when this appeal was 
decided, and in 1983, when the murder in question was committed.  See id. at 845 
(“Traditional ‘knife mark’ evidence is a subgroup of the broad category of evidence referred 
to as ‘tool mark’ evidence.  The theory underlying tool mark evidence . . . has long been 
upheld by courts.”).  
 199  See id. at 842 (expanding novelty by finding the particular application of a traditional 
technique to be novel enough to trigger the need for Frye).  
 200  Id. at 839.  
 201  See Daubert Revisited, supra note 195 (explaining the impact of Daubert on Frye, with 
particular reference to Ramirez).  
 202  Ramirez, 810 So.2d at 849–54.  
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publications, and judicial opinions,” and render a decision based on the facts 
of the case and the scientific methodology at hand.203  General acceptance 
requires impartial and independent proof.204  “A bald assertion by the expert 
that his deduction is premised upon well-recognized scientific principles is 
inadequate to establish its admissibility if the witness’s application of these 
principles is untested . . . .” 205 
In its decision, the Ramirez court established a four-part relevance test 
for establishing acceptance, which incorporated an understanding of 
scientific accuracy drawn from Daubert.206  First, the court should look to 
determine whether the methodology has been formally tested.207  Second, the 
court should evaluate whether the technique has been subjected to 
meaningful peer review.208  Third, the proponent of the evidence must prove 
the general acceptance of “both the underlying scientific principle” and “the 
testing procedures used to apply the principle to the facts of the case at 
hand.”209  Lastly, the court must consider whether a given technique has a 
quantified error rate, and if so, what that error rate is.210  As  in Washington, 
D.C., all Frye decisions in Florida are subject to de novo review.211  These 
criteria are grounded in the “underlying theory . . . that . . . [i]f the scientific 
community considers a procedure or process unreliable for its own purposes, 
then the procedure must be considered less reliable for courtroom use.”212 
In the process of affirming de novo as the appropriate standard of 
review for Frye, Florida chose to highlight the applicability of both legal 
reliability and scientific reliability.213  The existence of, and contrast 
between, the two standards, gives appellants an avenue by which to 
challenge the scientific evidence underpinning a conviction, irrespective of 
whether or not that evidence was deemed novel.214  Traditional applications 
of established scientific techniques must pass through the classic Rule 403 
test, which should inherently exclude evidence that is “unduly prejudicial, 
 
 203  Id. at 844.  
 204  Id. at 851 (“In applying the Frye criteria, general scientific recognition requires the 
testimony of impartial experts or scientists. It is this independent and impartial proof of 
general scientific acceptability that provides the necessary Frye foundation.”).  
 205  Id. at 844.  
 206  Daubert Revisited, supra note 195.  
 207  Ramirez, 810 So.2d at 849.  
 208  Id. at 849–50.  
 209  Id. at 851.  
 210  Id.  
 211  Id. at 844.  
 212  Id. at 843 (quoting Stokes v. State, 584 So.2d 188, 193–94 (Fla. 1989)).  
 213  See Ramirez, 810 So.2d at 842–46 (describing both the standards of review and 
appropriate applications of scientific and legal reliability).  
 214  Id.  
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misleading, or confusing”—in other words, patently untrue evidence.215  
Challenges under the traditional 403 test are reviewed on appeal under an 
abuse of discretion standard.216  Rule 403 analysis is “inapposite” in the 
presence of novel scientific methods or novel applications of existing 
scientific methods, as the “court may be unable to gauge accurately” the 
degree to which the jury may be misled.217  Therefore, challenges to Frye 
hearings are reviewed de novo, which has the beneficial effect of 
encouraging lower courts to rigorously apply the general acceptance test, lest 
they be reversed.218  In the instant case, the Florida Supreme Court found that 
the state’s proffered evidence failed the Frye test, and went so far as to call 
it a classic example of junk science.219  In this de novo review, assessing a 
novel application of a traditional scientific technique, the court reinforced 
the need to stringently apply Frye by stating: 
 
[i]n sum, [the state expert’s] knife mark identification 
procedure—at this point in time—cannot be said to carry the 
imprimatur of science. The procedure is a classic example of the 
kind of novel ‘scientific’ evidence that Frye was intended to 
banish—i.e., a subjective, untested, unverifiable identification 
procedure that purports to be infallible. The potential for error or 
fabrication in this procedure is inestimable. In order to preserve 
the integrity of the criminal justice system in Florida, particularly 
in the face of rising nationwide criticism of forensic evidence in 
general, our state courts—both trial and appellate—must apply the 
Frye test in a prudent manner to cull scientific fiction and junk 
science from fact.220 
D. Illinois—In re Commitment of Simons 
As stated in Illinois Rule of Evidence 702,221 and as confirmed by In re 
Commitment of Simons,222 Illinois is without a doubt a Frye jurisdiction.  
Unlike Florida, Illinois hearkens to an earlier version of Frye, rejecting the 
incorporation of Daubert-era innovations by stating that “Frye does not 
make the trial judge a ‘gatekeeper of’ all expert testimony.”223  Moreover, 
the Supreme Court of Illinois also explicitly rejected the burgeoning test it 
 
 215  Id. at 843.  
 216  Id. at 842–43.  
 217  Id.  
 218  Id. at 844–45.  
 219  Ramirez, 810 So.2d at 853.  
 220  Id.  
 221  ILL. R. EVID. 702.  
 222  821 N.E.2d 1184 (Ill. 2004).  
 223  Donaldson v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 767 N.E.2d 314, 324–326 (Ill. 2002).  
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termed “Frye-plus-reliability.”224 
In Illinois, the general acceptance test only applies to a scientific 
methodology that is “original or striking” or if that method “does not 
resemble something formerly known or used.”225  A theory will be deemed 
generally accepted if it is reasonably relied upon by experts in the field at 
issue.226  Once a principal has gained general acceptance it is almost 
impossible to dislodge it from the legal system, as its “general acceptance is 
presumed in subsequent litigation.”227  This viewpoint stems from the idea 
that the trial judge’s role is limited merely to ruling on the acceptance of a 
technique, and does not encompass shielding the fact finder from potentially 
baseless or later discredited scientific techniques.228  Any generally accepted 
technique will be presented to the fact finder, who then accords that expert 
what weight they will.229 
E. Maryland—Wilson v. State 
Like Illinois, Maryland is also a Frye state by statute. Unlike Illinois, 
however, the Maryland Supreme Court found merit in the so-called Frye-
plus-reliability standard, stating that, “[t]estimony concerning an unreliable 
scientific process . . . or unreliable opinion is of little value to a jury.”230  In 
2002, this principle was formalized in Wilson v. State,231 a case which 
reviewed the trial court’s decision to admit expert testimony that relied on 
the product rule—a statistical rule governing the probability of independent 
events—to prove that the appellant’s children almost certainly could not 
have both died of SIDS, thus implicating the appellant as a murderer.232 
In Maryland, general acceptance is defined as an absence of genuine 
controversy within the relevant scientific community.233  To determine 
whether or not the deaths of the petitioner’s children were conclusively 
independent, something the prosecution’s expert sought to disprove, the 
court consulted medical journals concerning pediatrics and genetics.234  
 
 224  Id. at 326.  
 225  In re Commitment of Simons, 821 N.E.2d at 1189 (quoting Donaldson, 764 N.E.2d at 
325).  
 226  Id.  
 227  Donaldson, 767 N.E.2d at 325.  
 228  In re Commitment of Simons, 821 N.E.2d at 1188–89 (limiting the judge’s role to 
consideration of general acceptance of novel scientific techniques).  
 229  Donaldson, 767 N.E.2d at 326 (“Questions concerning underlying data, and an 
expert’s application of generally accepted techniques, go to the weight of the evidence, rather 
than its admissibility.”).  
 230  Wilson v. State, 803 A.2d 1034, 1039 (Md. 2002).   
 231  Id. at 1039–47. 
 232  Id. at 1039–40.   
 233  Id. at 1045.   
 234  Id. at 1044.   
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Although the State cited articles suggesting there was no link between genes 
and SIDS, the broader scientific consensus, as observed in a majority of 
articles, took the position that it is “unknown whether there is a genetic 
component to SIDS.”235  Thus, because of the lively debate within the 
scientific community concerning the independence, or lack thereof, of SIDS 
deaths within a single family, the evidence was excluded under Frye.236 
Importantly, from Maryland’s initial acceptance of the general 
acceptance test in 1978, their courts mandated that the reliability of a novel 
scientific technique be a precondition for the admission of expert testimony, 
even before considering whether or not that technique had garnered general 
acceptance.237  As such, the state adopted a somewhat unique approach to 
incorporating the notion of novelty.  Established, non-novel techniques with 
broad and general acceptance within the scientific community, such as 
ballistics tests and blood tests, can be judicially noticed without a Frye 
hearing.238  Importantly, the inverse applies to techniques based on unsound 
science; “a court may take judicial notice that certain procedures, widely 
recognized as bogus or experimental, are unreliable.”239  When judicial 
notice is inappropriate, and a Frye hearing is necessary, the proponent of the 
evidence must demonstrate the reliability of the technique, and the court 
should also take notice of reliable scientific journals that evaluate the 
acceptance of a particular process.240  This affords a procedural avenue by 
which proven techniques can move through efficiently, and whereby 
dubiously valid techniques—even established ones—can appropriately be 
screened and eliminated from evidence where appropriate. 
F. New Jersey—State v. Doriguzzi 
With facts similar to People v. Leahy in California, State v. Doriguzzi241 
affirmed New Jersey’s continued use of Frye—albeit in a more limited 
capacity—in a case evaluating the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test.242  
 
 235  Id.  
 236  Wilson, 803 A.2d at 1044–45.  
 237  Id. at 1039 (citing Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364 (Md. 1978)).  
 238  Id. at 1039–40.  
 239  Id.  
 240  Id.  The court clarified its procedure in the following manner: “When the reliability of 
a particular technique is not subject to judicial notice, however, ‘it is necessary that the 
reliability be demonstrated before testimony based on the technique can be introduced into 
evidence. Although this demonstration will normally include testimony by witnesses, a court 
can and should also take notice of law journal articles, articles from reliable sources that 
appear in scientific journals, and other publications which bear on the degree of acceptance 
by recognized experts that a particular process has achieved.’”  Id. (quoting Reed, 391 A.2d 
at 368).  
 241  760 A.2d 336 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000). 
 242  Id. at 337.  
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Unique among the several states, New Jersey offers an example of a 
jurisdiction that divides its evidentiary test along criminal/civil lines.243  The 
state applies Daubert in toxic tort cases, while remaining a Frye jurisdiction 
in all other matters.244  The key issue in Doriguzzi was whether evidence 
gleaned from the HGN test was properly admitted at trial without any 
foundational testimony from an expert to establish general acceptance within 
the scientific community.245  Trial courts in New Jersey are not permitted to 
introduce evidence from novel techniques without evidence of expert 
acceptance, unless there exists a previously published New Jersey Supreme 
or Superior Court opinion that verifies that technique.246  In this instance, the 
prosecution argued that the HGN test was not scientific at all, but was simply 
an observation of the officer, thereby making it more properly characterized 
as lay testimony.247 
In New Jersey at the time, a proponent of a new scientific technique 
could demonstrate general acceptance in three ways: (1) by expert testimony 
from those in the relevant profession; (2) by “authoritative scientific and 
legal writings”; or (3) by judicial opinions.248  The Doriguzzi court surveyed 
court opinions from outside jurisdictions, as well as scientific and legal 
articles.249  The vast majority of states have found the HGN test to be 
scientific.250  The Doriguzzi court acknowledged that “[r]eliance on other 
courts’ opinions can be problematic ‘[u]nless the question of general 
acceptance has been thoroughly and thoughtfully litigated in [] previous 
cases.’”251  This latter consideration led the Doiguzzi court to give credence 
to a Illinois Supreme Court opinion that had disallowed use of the 
technique.252  Illinois had rejected HGN testing on the grounds that the 
relevant scientific community sharply diverged as to “the correlation 
between the BAC level and the angle of onset at which nystagmus occurs.”253  
Because New Jersey adheres to the notion that jurists are not scientists, it 
leaned on this science-backed legal opinion in deciding not to admit evidence 
of HGN testing.254 
 
 243  State v. Harvey, 668 A.2d 596 (N.J. 1997).  
 244  Id.  
 245  Doriguzzi, 760 A.2d at 337. 
 246  Id.  
 247  Id. at 339. 
 248  Id. at 341–42.  
 249  Id. at 342–43.  
 250  Id. at 342.  
 251  Doriguzzi, 760 A.2d at 346 (quoting People v. Kirk, 681 N.E.2d 1037 (Ill. 1997)).  
 252  Id. at 337.  
 253  Id. at 341–46 (quoting State v. Witte, 836 P.2d 110, 1119–21 (Kan. 1992)).  
 254  Id. at 342.  
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G. New York—State v. LeGrand 
New York offers a version of the Frye standard that directly prevents 
the court from considering the reliability of a technique.255  In 2007, the 
Court of Appeals of New York opined on whether it was proper to admit 
expert testimony concerning the reliability of eyewitness testimony.256  In its 
opinion, the LeGrand court stated that the Frye test asks whether a technique 
generates “results accepted as reliable within the scientific community.”257  
In doing so, the emphasis lies on the importance of “‘counting scientists’ 
votes, rather than . . . verifying the soundness of a scientific conclusion.”258  
Once a technique is validated by Frye, further hearings need not be 
conducted.259  Largely on these grounds, the court concluded that expert 
testimony concerning eyewitness identification was admissible in that 
instance,260 and that it was an “abuse of a court’s discretion to exclude expert 
testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identifications.”261 
Although LeGrand is a rare instance of a defendant prevailing in an 
evidentiary challenge, it is worth noting that the case involved evidence that 
the defendant was seeking to enter—not a challenge to the scientific 
underpinnings of the prosecution’s evidence.262  Under the formula outlined 
by the LeGrand court, New York’s version of the Frye test does not take the 
scientific reliability of a technique into consideration.263  Instead, it adheres 
to a version of the Frye test explicitly rejected in other jurisdictions264—a 
simple poll.265  As there is minimal inquiry beyond a headcount, it offers 
defendants few chances to the scientific validity of a forensic technique.266 
 
 255  See People v. LeGrand, 867 N.E.2d 374, 379 (N.Y. 2007) (finding that establishing 
scientific reliability under the Frye test is based on a poll of scientists within the relevant 
community).  
 256  Id. at 376.  
 257  Id. at 379 (quoting Parker v. Mobil Oil Corp., 857 N.E.2d 1114, 1120 (N.Y. 2006)).  
 258  Id. (quoting People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451, 464 (N.Y. 1994)).  
 259  Id. at 380 (quoting Wesley, 633 N.E.2d at 462).  
 260  See id. (finding that “a number of New York courts” admitted eyewitness 
identification through the Frye test).  
 261  LeGrand, 867 N.E.2d at 379.  
 262  Id. at 375.  
 263  Id. at 379 (quoting Wesley, 633 N.E.2d at 464).  
 264  See, e.g., supra Part III.C, discussing Ramirez v. State, specifically the text at footnote 
202, where the Florida Supreme Court defined general acceptance as more than a “nose count” 
of experts, designating the court’s role as rendering a decision based on all relevant sources, 
the facts of the case, and the scientific methodology at hand.  Id.  
 265  LeGrand, 867 N.E.2d at 354.  
 266  Id.  
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H. Pennsylvania—Commonwealth v. Dengler 
Like Illinois, Pennsylvania is a Frye state by statute.267  Also, like 
Illinois, and New York as well, it offers a test of limited utility.268  Confirmed 
as a Frye state in Grady v. Frito-Lay, Inc,269 Pennsylvania’s test is triggered 
by novel science, or scientific techniques used in a novel way.270  Novelty is 
determined on an individualized basis; science initially deemed novel can be 
affected by a developing consensus or the strength of a later proponent’s 
offer.271  Items that are the subject of statutory provisions, such as the 
psychiatric criteria by which a sexual offender is deemed a sexually violent 
predator, are ineligible for consideration under Frye.272  Once novelty is 
established, the test then requires the proponent to show that the 
methodology used is generally accepted within the relevant scientific 
community, but not that the scientific community has generally accepted an 
expert’s conclusions.273  On appeal, Frye rulings are judged by an abuse of 
discretion review.274  The Frye test in Pennsylvania remains one designed to 
protect the jury from the “mystic infallibility” of scientific evidence,275 and 
employs a strict definition of novelty.276 
I. Washington—State v. Greene 
In admitting expert evidence, the state of Washington employs a two-
part inquiry.277  First, testimony must pass its version of the Frye test.278  
Second, the testimony must be admissible under state rule of evidence 702 
(ER 702).279  In State v. Greene,280 the Supreme Court of Washington 
evaluated whether evidence of dissociative identity disorder was admissible 
 
 267  PA. R. EVID.  702(c).  
 268  See supra Parts III.D and III.G.  
 269  839 A.2d 1038 (Pa. 2003).  
 270  Commonwealth v. Dengler, 890 A.2d 372, 382 (Pa. 2005).  
 271  Id.  
 272  Id. at 382–83.  
 273  Id. at 386 (citing Grady v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 839 A.2d 1038, 1045 (Pa. 2003)).  
 274  Id. at 378.  
 275  Id. at 381 (quoting Commonwealth v. Topa, 369 A.2d 1277, 1282 (Pa. 1977)).  
 276  See Dengler, 890 A.2d at 382 (limiting Frye to novel evidence and emphasizing the 
court’s ability to rely on previous decisions in lieu of further Frye hearings on a given subject).  
 277  State v. Greene, 984 P.2d 1024, 1027 (Wash. 1999).  
 278  See id.  Under Washington State’s version of the Frye test, novel evidence is 
admissible if “(1) the scientific theory or principal upon which the evidence is based has 
gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community of which it is a part; and (2) 
there are generally accepted methods of applying that theory or principle in a manner capable 
of producing reliable results.”  Id.  
 279  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 702 (West 2017).  
 280  984 P.2d 1024 (Wash. 1999). 
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to establish a defense of either insanity or diminished capacity.281  In order 
to evaluate the admissibility of the defense’s proffered evidence, the court 
analyzed “the level of recognition accorded to the scientific principle 
involved.”282  That level of recognition hinged on whether there was 
“significant dispute between qualified experts” or not.283  Specifically, the 
court looked to general acceptance within the scientific community, “without 
reference to its forensic application in any particular case.”284 
In spite of the fact that the court determined that there existed a 
moderate, ongoing dispute as to the strength of dissociative identity disorder, 
the Greene court found that testimony regarding the condition met the Frye 
standard.285  To meet ER 702, however, a scientific principle must not only 
be generally accepted, but it must also be capable of forensic application to 
the facts of a particular case.286  Ultimately, the Supreme Court of 
Washington excluded the testimony on the grounds that it could not be 
applied to the facts, as such testimony could not help the fact finder 
determine whether the defendant was mentally culpable.287  This adds 
another mechanism for evaluating the validity of established expertise which 
may be flawed as offered in the particular case in a different fashion than 
takes place in Florida or Maryland.288 
V.  EVOLVING FRYE 
A. The Merits of Frye in Criminal Prosecution 
In an ideal world, Daubert would be a perfectly adequate test for 
assessing the validity of expert evidence in the criminal justice system.  Were 
defendants able to afford to wage a bona fide battle of the experts,289 were 
the system unburdened of costs, time, and a full caseload, then perhaps each 
case could live up to the Daubert court’s expectations.290  In reality, however, 
 
 281  Id. at 1025.  
 282  Id. at 1027.  
 283  Id. (emphasis added).  
 284  Id.  
 285  Id.  
 286  Greene, 984 P.2d. at 1029.  
 287  See id. at 1032 (holding that dissociative identity disorder is generally accepted in the 
psychiatric and psychological communities).  
 288  Compare Greene, 984 P.2d at 1024–32 (using a statutory mechanism to tie Frye to a 
relevance standard), with Ramirez v. State, 810 So.2d 836 (Fla. 2001), and Wilson v. State, 
803 A.2d 1034, 1039 (Md. 2002) (modifying the common law in order to add a relevance 
requirement to Frye). 
 289  See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 11 (outlining the limitations which 
bear upon criminal defendants).  
 290  See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) (detailing the 
Court’s hopes for the adversarial process with respect to expert evidence).  
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we need to account for the system of criminal justice that we have.  It is one 
where inescapable and practical constraints mean that in most trials it is only 
the prosecution that presents expert evidence.291  It is one where “most 
commentators believe ostensibly scientific testimony may sway a jury even 
when, as science, it is palpably wrong.”292  In far too many instances, the 
realities of criminal prosecution have forced an unequal application of 
Daubert whereby 
 
civil cases are subject to strict standards of expertise quality 
control, while criminal cases are not. The result [is] that the 
pocketbooks of civil defendants [are] protected from plaintiffs’ 
claims by exclusion of undependable expert testimony, but that 
criminal defendants [are not] protected from conviction based on 
similarly undependable expert testimony.293 
 
How, then, can we serve the twin goals of criminal justice—
apprehending the guilty and exonerating the innocent?294  Although the 
potential of Frye’s test seems never to have been fully realized,295 Frye, at 
its core, possessed the requisite muster.296  This may explain why, in the 
wake of Daubert, some jurisdictions revitalized their respective Frye tests.297  
At the center of Frye lies an “essentially conservative nature”298 that affords 
scientists a leading role in determining which techniques are sound enough 
to be presented to lay jurors.299  This directly dovetails with the driving 
purpose behind this conference.  In essence, Frye hews towards the 
antiquated but desirable goal of appointing a jury of experts, in the end 
allowing those qualified to offer a preliminary assessment.300 
 
 
 291  Berger, supra note 67, at 1359 (“Studies show that courts have been quite reluctant to 
authorize funds for defense experts.”).  
 292  Black et al., supra note 12, at 789.  
 293  Risinger, supra note 146, at 99.  
 294  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 96.  
 295  See Daubert Revisited, supra note 195 (explicating the underlying issues with Frye, 
but offering up a Florida Supreme Court case as “a reinvigorated Frye test”).  
 296  Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. 1923) (“The thing from which the 
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the 
particular field in which it belongs.”).  
 297  See id.  
 298  People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 325 (Cal. 1994).  
 299  See People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1245 (Cal. 1976) (“Frye was deliberately intended 
to interpose a substantial obstacle to the unrestrained admission of evidence based upon new 
scientific principles.”).  
 300  See People v. Barbara, 255 N.W.2d 171, 194 (Mich. 1977) (describing Frye as an 
extension of the tradition of the expert jury).  
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Filtering expert testimony through Frye in trial level rulings—rulings 
which are subject to a highly deferential standard of appellate review—
redirects the foundation of evidentiary decisions away from judges and 
lawyers who “generally lack the scientific expertise necessary to 
comprehend and evaluate forensic evidence in an informed manner.”301  It 
stands to reason that criminal justice’s drastically higher burden of proof—
where the penalty is freedom as opposed to pecuniary loss—deserves a more 
stringent standard that will better shield determinations of guilt from the 
“vagaries of pseudoscience.”302 
B. Building a Better Frye Test 
The ultimate goal of Frye was to ensure that expert evidence is based 
on “sound scientific principles.”303  Sadly, it has frequently failed to live up 
to that goal.304  Its flaws lie in either excluding good science, or allowing past 
admission of bad science to serve as grounds for future admission.305  Up to 
this point, however, these issues stem not from the spirit of Frye, but rather 
from its implementation.  The vagueness of key elements of the case have 
“allowed judges to pay lip service to Frye, yet base admissibility decisions 
on their own substantive scientific judgments and/or personal biases.”306 
The core of Frye, on its face, is in line with the goals of excluding junk 
science and banning flawed methods.  What is needed to bridge the gap 
between theory and practice, then, is renewed focus on Frye’s key terms, 
allowing Frye to live up to its original promise.  To do so, one must take a 
hard look at current Frye standards, and identify the factors that advance 
these goals and those that hinder them.  As described above, some state 
standards have been strengthened—by adding Daubert’s reliability elements 
into the general acceptance test.307  It is this “Frye-plus-reliability”308 model 
which offers the best hope to “preserve the integrity of the criminal justice 
 
 301  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 110.  
 302  Leahy, 882 P.2d at 332.  
 303  Bahura v. S.E.W. Inv’rs, 745 A.2d 928, 948 (D.C. 2000).  
 304  See Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence, supra note 89, at 1207–08 (writing 
fourteen years before the passage of Daubert that “the problems Frye has engendered—the 
difficulties in applying the test and the anomalous results it creates—so far outweigh these 
advantages that the argument for adopting a different test has become overwhelming”). 
 305  See Cino, supra note 9, at 660 (listing Frye’s shortcomings as a series of unanswered 
questions, including “[w]ho determines the relevant scientific community,” “[h]ow does the 
court define the relevant scientific community,” and “[h]ow mainstreatmainstream should a 
theory or technique be before it becomes relevant”).  
 306  See Schwartz, supra note 31, at 154.  
 307 See Daubert Revisited, supra note 195 (saying that Ramirez v. State, 810 So.2d 836 
(Fla. 2001) “represents a reinvigorated Frye test, and it is not alone”).  
 308  Donaldson v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 767 N.E.2d 314, 326 (Ill. 2002).  
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system” by distinguishing “science fiction and junk science from fact.”309  
To achieve this goal, this article proposes a five-pronged approach: first, 
expand the definition of novelty; second, clarify the meaning of general 
acceptance; third, determine the makeup of the relevant scientific 
community, and the role that group plays in conjunction with the trial judge; 
fourth, clarify the test for determining reliability; and fifth, build in pressure 
valves for correcting errors. 
Novelty is the characteristic that triggers the Frye test.310  Too often, 
however, courts rest their decisions on the fact that the proffered scientific 
method had previously been admitted into evidence, even in the face of 
evidence that the proffered technique had lost the general acceptance of the 
scientific community.311  Therefore, the definition of novelty needs to be 
broadened to apply Frye analysis to a larger category of expert analysis.  The 
novelty requirement should not only be triggered by the novelty of a whole 
field of science, but it also should be particularized to the way in which a 
forensic scientist is applying that field in a given case.312  Florida provides 
an admirable example.313  In Ramierez v. State, the Florida Supreme Court 
applied the Frye test to a case involving tool mark evidence, even though 
tool mark evidence had been used in court for decades prior to the Ramirez 
case.314  What the court was reviewing, and what triggered the Frye test, was 
the particular expert’s application of the expertise to the facts in the case at 
hand.315  The court excluded his examination, which claimed to be able to 
identify the defendant’s knife with perfect accuracy, as a new application of 
a very old scientific principle.316  Broadening the mandatory application of 
the Frye test in this fashion will require courts to re-examine old techniques 
when applied to novel fact patterns, thus ensuring that more cases are 
exposed to the rigor of evaluating the underlying veracity of scientific 





 309  Id. at 853.  
 310  Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. 1923).  
 311  See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 107 (“[C]ourts often ‘affirm 
admissibility citing earlier decisions rather than facts established at a hearing’”) (quoting 
Neufeld, supra note 33, at S109)).  
 312  Ramirez v. State, 810 So.2d 836 (Fla. 2001).  
 313  Id.  
 314  See id. at 842 (expanding novelty by finding the particular application of a traditional 
technique to be novel enough to trigger the need for Frye).  
 315  See id. (particularizing Frye’s novelty requirement such that it applies to a specific 
forensic expert’s version of knife mark identification procedure).  
 316  Id.  
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Second, after the trigger for Frye analysis is better defined, Frye’s 
parameters require further clarification.  The definition of “general 
acceptance” has frustrated judges and academics alike for decades.317  
Fortunately, one of the great gifts of common law jurisprudence is the ability 
to redefine key terms after the fact.318  In this instance, several state courts 
have offered a lesson in how to (and how not to) define general acceptance.  
As Frye seeks to account for the power of experts over fact finders,319 and to 
ensure protection from spurious science,320 general acceptance cannot 
merely be limited to a headcount.  It should be properly defined as an absence 
of genuine controversy within the relevant scientific community at the time 
of the court’s analysis.321 
Third, it is important to properly identify both the makeup of the 
relevant scientific community, and to clarify the role(s) that group should 
play in the trial judge’s analysis.  In order to determine whether controversy 
exists with regard to the particular scientific principle, it is helpful to think 
of support for a given theory as akin to sufficiency, whereas the quality of 
that support is analogous to weight.  To meet Frye’s requirement of general 
acceptance, a theory should have both broad support, as well as the support 
of the key leaders in that field.322  In answering this question, the judge serves 
as the bridge between the scientific and legal worlds.  It is her or his role to 
ensure that the proponent’s claim rests on more than a bald assertion of 
acceptability.323  Rather, the judge must make a determination of whether the 
scientific principle enjoys general acceptance by weighing all relevant 
scientific sources, including “expert testimony, scientific and legal 





 317  See Cino, supra note 9, at 660 (stating the lack of a workable definition as a key flaw 
in Frye).  
 318  See Imwinkelried, supra note 1 (“Later courts developed the policy rationale that was 
conspicuously missing in the original Frye opinion.”). Edward J. Imwinkelried, The 
Importance of Daubert in Frye Jurisdictions, 42 CRIM. L. BULL. 215 (2006). 
 319  See Imwinkelried, supra note 1 (describing the historical fear held by the court that a 
risk will “overawe lay jurors”).  
 320  People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 332 (Cal. 1994) (seeking to protect jurors from “the 
vagaries of pseudoscience” via Frye).  
 321  See e.g., Wilson v. State, 803 A.2d 1034, 1045 (Md. 2002) (defining general 
acceptance as an absence of genuine controversy within the relevant scientific community).  
 322  See id. at 844.  See id. at 1039–40. 
 323  Ramirez v. State, 810 So.2d 836, 844 (Fla. 2001) (“A bald assertion by the expert that 
his deduction is premised upon well-recognized scientific principles is inadequate to establish 
its admissibility if the witness’s application of these principles is untested[.]”).  
 324  Id. at 844.  
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Fourth, the judge must ensure that the sources being used to evaluate 
acceptance are indeed reliable.  Drawing on the “Frye-plus-reliability” tests 
featured in Florida325 and Maryland,326 which fold Daubert-esque factors 
into general acceptance, judges should consider a three-step process for 
evaluating reliability.  First, judges should look to the methodology used in 
the given field, and whether standards have been established.  Second, tests 
used to prove a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt should 
themselves be subject to statistical scrutiny in the form of both meaningful 
peer review, and the establishment of a quantifiable error rate.  Lastly, the 
proponent of a theory should be obligated to prove general acceptance of 
both the underlying scientific principle and the acceptance of the procedure 
used to apply that principle to the facts at hand in a case.  Applying these 
three factors will exclude “[t]estimony concerning an unreliable scientific 
process,” as an “unreliable opinion is of little value to a jury.”327 
Fifth, Frye requires mechanisms on both the trial and appellate levels 
designed to excise extreme examples of flawed science from the system.  
Maryland offers a prime example for course correcting at the trial level in 
circumstances involving non-novel procedures.328  Currently, non-novel 
techniques with broad acceptance, including ballistics tests and blood tests, 
can be excused from Frye analysis through judicial notice.  In Maryland, the 
inverse is also true; when patently unsound science comes before the bench, 
“a court may take judicial notice that certain procedures, widely recognized 
as bogus or experimental, are unreliable.”329  If Maryland’s procedure were 
to be applied in conjunction with Federal Rule of Evidence 201’s 
requirement that a noticed fact “be accurately and readily determined from 
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned,”330 the trial 
judge’s inquiry would expand to include a contemporary understanding of 
any given scientific technique.  Judicial notice affords a procedural avenue 
by which proven techniques can move through efficiently, and whereby 
suspect techniques—even established ones—can be screened out of the trial 
process. 
At the appellate level, removing unsound science would be facilitated 
by emphasizing the opportunities for relief that apply to techniques that meet 
the expanded definition of novelty, as well as established scientific 
 
 325  Id.  
 326  Wilson, 803 A.2d at 1039.  
 327  Id. 
 328  See id. (allowing judges to take judicial notice that techniques are empirically 
unreliable).  
 329  Id. at 1039–40.  
 330  FED. R. EVID. 201.  
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techniques. Florida331 and California332 review their Frye decisions de novo.  
As no judge wants to be reversed, de novo review will encourage trial judges 
to be especially conscientious in adjudicating Frye issues.  For addressing 
non-novel evidence, the Ramirez court made it clear that there are two 
avenues for relief: one under which evidence that meets its expanded 
definition of novelty can be challenged de novo; and another under which 
traditional applications of traditional techniques can be challenged, albeit by 
an abuse of discretion standard.333  Though the likelihood of success is 
drastically lower under an abuse of discretion standard, emphasizing both 
avenues highlights a commitment to excising convictions that rest on faulty 
science. 
VI.  FRYE, REVISED AND APPLIED 
In Professor Imwinkelried’s 2017 article,334 he outlined five stages at 
which prejudicial errors can be introduced into the trial process via flawed 
expert testimony: (1) the witness’s status as an expert; (2) the general 
technique or theory on which the witness relies, otherwise known as the 
major premise; (3) the witness’s case-specific facts, or the minor premise; 
(4) the application of the major premise to the minor premise; and (5) the 
final conclusion. His statutory, post-conviction remedy, offers a clear step 
forward in terms of remedying past mistakes that balances the need for 
finality against the demands of accuracy.335  Trial courts, however, remain 
the best cost avoiders, with the greatest ability to mitigate the risk of 
convictions that rest on faulty evidence, thereby helping to obviate the need 
for post-conviction litigation. 
This paper’s proposed Frye-plus-reliability standard most clearly helps 
to mitigate the introduction of error at stages two and four of Professor 
Imwinkelried’s outline of the trial process. It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to propose tighter standards upon experts (step one), or their 
conclusions (step five), as those concerns can only be addressed by the 
forensic community itself.  Moreover, case specific facts (step three) must 
be accepted as given.  By addressing error at steps two and four, the expert’s 
technique and the application of that technique to the facts of a case, the 





 331  Ramirez v. State, 810 So.2d 836 (Fla. 2001).  
 332  People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321 (Cal. 1994).  
 333  Ramirez, 810 So.2d. at 843.  
 334  Imwinkelried, supra note 42. 
 335  Imwinkelried, supra note 42.  
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On its face, Frye has always been designed to address the second step 
governing the admission of expert evidence: the technique which an expert 
will apply to the facts of a case.  The trigger for the test, however, has 
traditionally been limited to novel techniques.  Expanding the trigger for the 
test—a broadening of the novelty requirement—will expose a greater 
number of techniques and theories to the scrutiny of the scientific 
community.  Moreover, the proposed expansion of judicial notice would 
afford a second layer of protection against the presentation of flawed 
scientific evidence.  Judges would be allowed to exclude egregious examples 
of faulty techniques, even non-novel ones, thus preserving the scientific 
integrity of the trial through the second stage. 
The proposed model offers a chance to stretch Frye to cover the 
introduction of error at stage four by expanding the novelty requirement to 
include the major premise’s application to the minor premise.  Florida’s 
example, where a forensic scientist was applying tool mark evidence, offers 
a case-in-point example for excluding subsequently invalidated evidence 
through Frye.  The Florida Supreme Court’s justification for excluding that 
technique stemmed from the idea that the application of the technique itself 
was novel.  Expanding novelty in this fashion provides a new layer for 
effectively monitoring expert testimony in criminal cases. 
Frye can never be stretched to incorporate Professor Imwinkelried’s 
final stage where error can be introduced—the ultimate conclusions of 
experts.  The court cannot regulate what forensic experts decide.  The 
knowledge and training of these experts positions them as key to interpreting 
forensic evidence.  By interposing the scientific community between 
individual experts and the ears of jurors, however, the conclusions of those 
experts will not need to be regulated.  The Frye-plus-reliability test is 
designed to screen out error, whether because of the expert’s reliance on 
unsound techniques, or unsound application of existing techniques to 
particular facts, at the earliest possible stage. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
There were excellent reasons for trying to improve upon the Frye 
standard.  Conventional wisdom is not the arbiter of ultimate truth, 
particularly scientific truth. Just tell Galileo that the sun revolves around the 
earth, or Marie Curie that there are no new elements to be discovered, or 
Elon Musk that electric cars are insipid.  Daubert and Rule 702 enormously 
improved the world of civil litigation, affording attorneys on both sides the 
opportunity to offer cutting edge science in pursuit of civil justice.  Criminal 
law, however, is simply a different world. On a practical level, it is not 
feasible to expect criminal defendants—the majority of whom are 
represented by defenders’ associations—to wage a battle of the experts 
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against the state.  Simply put, Frye is a standard of exclusion and Daubert is 
a standard of inclusion.  When it is liberty that is at risk, scientific consensus 
and certainty are the pillars upon which reasonable doubt should rest.  This 
is why a return to the Frye test, updated for the Daubert age, offers the best 
chance to improve the quality of expert evidence underpinning criminal 
convictions. 
 
